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 Abstract                                                                                      
This thesis examines household characteristics as determinants of formal savings 
accounts in rural Malawi. The main questions answered in this paper include the effects 
of household characteristics on the probability of having formal savings, the amounts 
saved in these accounts, and the probability of adopting formal savings. The central 
discussion aims to identify the initial adopters of formal savings accounts, using a 
marketing approach previously unapplied to this area of research. This paper also 
contributes to the dialogue of the household composition by considering three untried 
variables: number of adults, number of children, and literacy of all household members. 
Results show that households are most likely to adopt formal savings, when provided 
access, if they have a head who can read Chichewa, a functional cellphone, more adults 
who can read Chichewa, and are close to the bank service. The field evidence comes 
from research conducted over a two year period 2008-2010 in sampled regions of Central 
Malawi. 
 
 
 
 Acknowledgements                                                                                     
I thank Professor Jeffrey A. Flory for guiding my thesis with his expertise in economic 
development, and allowing me to take a marketing perspective on the topic. Professor 
Flory was highly involved in this project throughout the eight month period of its 
development. I am particularly indebted for his exhaustive feedback and suggestions that 
have played an integral role in carving out this finished product. The Opportunity 
International Bank of Malawi, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Wadonda 
Consullt, and the IRIS/FSA team at the University of Maryland deserve recognition for 
conducting, collecting, and reviewing the field evidence analyzed in this paper.  
i 
 
Table of Contents 
 
  I. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 
 
 II. Empirical Setting and Sample Data ..................................................................................... 10 
      i. Sample and Data Collection .............................................................................................. 14 
      ii. Data Description: Variables in Focus .............................................................................. 18 
 
III. Effects of Household Size and Literacy ............................................................................... 21 
 
IV. Household Determinants of Having Formal Savings ......................................................... 27 
 
 V. Household Determinants of Having Formal Savings and  
      Amounts Saved at the Baseline ............................................................................................. 36 
 
VI. Household Determinants of Having Formal Savings and 
       Amounts Saved at the Endline ............................................................................................. 41 
 
VII. Household Determinants of Adopting Formal Savings .................................................... 46 
        i. Identifying the Innovators ................................................................................................... 49 
        ii. Identifying the Early Adopters .......................................................................................... 52 
 
VIII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 56 
 
  
   
 
ii 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Traditionally, the term “microfinance” mostly referred to microcredit, but 
recently, researchers and practitioners are starting to see the benefits of microsavings as well.  
Introducing formal services of microsavings is an under-studied (yet, well questioned) method 
that adds liquidity to stagnant economies. Those who support such services focus on 
empowering the poor to escape poverty traps, and those who question these services often 
highlight the ethical issues that come with the pressures of transaction costs. Call it a man-
made lake in a desert of poverty, or a pacemaker to the heartbeat of markets, microsavings has 
become a popular approach in efforts to alleviate poverty.  
Microsavings, in particular, may prove to be an effective tool to suppress poverty 
because studies have shown that the poor want to save. In a study on access to financial 
services in Nepal, Prina (2013) found that even though the poor wanted to save, their demand 
for savings accounts was unmet. Her study revealed that when administrator and withdrawal 
fees were excluded, 84% of the sampled households opened formal savings accounts, all of 
which did not crowd out savings in other informal institutions.  
It might be the case that a poor household demands access to formal savings, but 
is unable to adopt or regularly use the service due to conditions within the household. For 
example, if the fees for using formal accounts were not excluded in Prina’s study (2013), the 
take up of formal savings might have been lower than expected due to a household’s budget 
constraint, size, etc. That said, I believe that financial institutions can leverage the untapped 
demand for formal savings effectively by understanding how household characteristics may 
affect their decision to opt for formal savings accounts. Let us review some important 1  
findings that deal with household characteristics of the poor. 
The existing literature that looks at household determinants of financial services 
usage suggests that the reach and success of microsavings programs can be accelerated with 
improvements in policy design and implementation. To this end, many studies have 
experimented with, and examined different facets of micro-savings policies. For instance, 
Dupas and Robinson (2011) run a field experiment to examine whether access to formal 
savings services leads to business growth in poor countries. They find that women saved more 
in bank accounts than men. In fact, women took up savings accounts even with negative 
interest rates. The rationale they give is that banks offer women a more secure holding of their 
savings and make it less vulnerable to theft or loss. On the other hand, they argue that men 
were able to save more safely at home than women. This finding suggests that formal savings 
providers may achieve higher savings rates if they cater more to women than to men. We can 
extend this question to the household level by asking if the gender of the account owner has a 
similar effect if he or she is the head of that household. I find that the gender of the household 
head does affect the likelihood of having a formal savings account – male household heads 
are 8.6 percentage points more likely to have a formal savings account, significant at the .01 
level1.  
Schaner (2011) looks at the effects of reducing ATM withdrawal fees on take up 
of formal savings accounts by men and women. She looks at how people of different genders 
respond to withdrawal of transaction costs for formal savings. She concludes that reducing 
ATM fees increased savings rates (by 40%) for accounts owned by men, but reduced savings 
rates (by a negligible/insignificant percentage) for accounts owned by women. Men save 
1 See Table 4 Column 1  2  
                                                        
higher amounts when transaction costs are low, but there aren’t any increases in savings of 
women. This implies that the frequency of transactions of men’s savings accounts might be 
more than women’s. Therefore, women might take up savings accounts to have a secure place 
to store money but use less ATM withdrawals. This hypothesis is corroborated by Dupas, 
Robinson, Green, and Keats’ findings in an experiment conducted in Kenya (2012). In a 
sample of 840 individuals over a period of 10-12 months, they found that the average number 
of withdrawals for men was 3.31 compared to only 0.96 for women. 
Several other studies have looked at household income, gender of the household 
head, education, and expenditures as determinants of savings. Ackah and Acquah inquire 
which households use which financial services (in Ghana). They find that the household 
head’s age is positively correlated to take up of formal savings. As the household head ages, 
he or she is 0.3 percentage points more likely to adopt formal savings. I find a similar weak 
effect of age: as the household head ages, he or she is 0.1 percentage points more likely to 
adopt formal savings when simply provided access2. Ackah and Acquah also find that 
household size is positive and significant indicator of savings take-up. This finding is 
consistent with my results as well. Each additional member in the household increases the 
likelihood of having a savings account by 1.2 percentage points, significant at the .01 level3.  
Woodruff and Martinez (2008), on the other hand, look at community level 
characteristics as determinants of savings adoption. They find that education and household 
assets have a significant impact on the opening of savings accounts in urban households; 
while wealth, expenditure, and ownership of agricultural business are significant in the 
2 See Table 7 Column 2  3 See Table 2 Column 2   3  
                                                        
opening of savings accounts in rural households. Compared to the lowest schooling group, 
household heads with at least 6 years of schooling are 10 percentage points more likely to 
open a savings account. Such effect increases marginally with more years of education. The 
effect of literacy (measured as the ability to read) in our sample has similar results. For a 
household with a literate head, the probability of adopting a formal savings account increases 
by 2.4 percentage points, significant at the .01 level. In addition, the marginal effect of every 
literate household member is 4.6 percentage points, significant at the .01 level4. In addition, 
Woodruff and Martinez find that business ownership has no significant effect on the 
likelihood of opening a savings account. My findings are consistent with this result as well. 
Ownership of a business has no significant effect on adoption of a savings account for all 
observations4. 
Aggarwal and Klapper (2012) comment that less attention is given to savings 
constraints in developing or poor economies, which might reduce the efficiency of 
microsavings providers. In order to improve the efficiency of microsavings programs, we 
need to place a magnifying glass over their current operations and strategies. More efficient 
approaches of microsavings can cut operating costs to the organization and boost financial 
inclusion amongst poor populations. Mel, McIntosh, and Woodruff (2013) suggest one such 
improvement by experimenting with savings collection techniques of National Savings Bank 
(NSB) in Sri Lanka. They compare face-to-face deposit collection to a self-deposit lockbox 
for formal accounts in rural communities, and provide a cost cutting, more efficient result. 
They find that deposit collection through lockboxes increase savings balance when the 
lockboxes are placed less frequently (biweekly as opposed to weekly) in rural communities, 
4 See Table 7 Column 1   4  
                                                        
which lower operating costs. In addition, they find that frequent face-to-face deposit 
collection increases households’ savings in the short run. Similar to these findings, there are a 
few guidelines that formal institutions can consider to become more efficient. 
Simply expanding formal savings access into unreached poor locations or 
promoting formal savings in these areas may not grasp as many customers as a financial 
institution might expect. Individual household characteristics might discourage households 
from adopting formal savings for different reasons. For example, households with more 
salaried adults may choose to adopt because they accumulate more savings, or households 
with more dependents may choose not to adopt in order to avoid transaction fees. Therefore, it 
is important for financial institutions to take a closer look at the household level determinants 
of formal savings adoption. I believe that if formal savings providers are aware of household 
characteristics that maximize probability of savings adoption, they might be able to cut down 
operational costs by expanding access geared towards households with those characteristics. 
While reviewing existing literature in microsavings, most of which is discussed 
earlier, I came across several studies that look at the effects of community level and 
household level characteristics on the take up and usage of formal savings accounts. I did not, 
however, come across a study specifically geared towards identifying common features of 
households that become the initial adopters of formal savings. That said, my study pushes the 
existing literature forward with this goal – to outline a “bulls eye” household for formal 
savings providers. With an explicit answer to “who is most likely to adopt formal savings 
account?”, microsavings providers can strategically target households that become their first 
customers. I aim to answer this question in a two-fold manner: Who is most likely to adopt 
formal savings when simply granted access? And who is most likely to adopt formal savings 
5  
when exposed to the promotions and informational campaigns of a bank? Answers to these 
questions can allow savings providers to expand their services to households with a predicted 
savings adoption decision. 
One of the purposes of this thesis is to serve the policy makers (governments, 
MFIs, development organizations, NGOs, financial institutions, and others) by providing a 
benchmark of the “most likely to save” household to target as the savings customer. I refer to 
these households as the “initial adopters” of formal savings. These households become the 
first customers of formal savings providers when they expand access to new locations. A 
detailed understanding of initial adopters is discussed below.   
To better understand the dynamic of savings adoption, I use the Revised 
Technology Adoption Life Cycle as put forth by Geoffrey A. Moore in Crossing the Chasm5. 
The Technology Adoption Life Cycle translates well into understanding the time-line of 
growing savings adoption within a rural community. The model can be used to categorize the 
poor households (the “customers” of an MFI) into five groups (Innovators, Early Adopters, 
Early Majority, Late Majority, Laggards) and the model places them in order of their 
adoption behavior. The life cycle of formal savings adoption, as applied to Moore’s model, is 
illustrated in figure 1: 
 
 
5 A. Moore, Geoffrey. 2002. Crossing the chasm: Marketing and selling disruptive 
products to mainstream customers. 3rd ed. Harper Business (HarperCollins Publishers) 
Note: Moore’s revised model of the technology adoption is an extension of Everett M. 
Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovators theory, originally published in 1962. I use Moore’s 
revised version of the model because it introduces the concept of “gaps” between each 
group of customer, which I believe is essential to highlight the differences in these groups 
of adopters.  6  
                                                        
  
 
 
 
           Figure 1: The Revised Technology Adoption Life Cycle, by Geoffrey A. Moore 
 
As we move from the left to right along the bell curve, the area under the curve 
represents the population that takes up savings6. Innovators are the first small group to 
adopt savings; Early adopters are the next group to adopt savings; Early majority is the 
next large pool of households to adopt savings; and Late majority and Laggards follow.  
As the first to adopt a new product or service, Moore writes that Innovators are 
new technology enthusiasts -“they seek them out even before a formal marketing program has 
been launched”. In our experiment, Innovators are poor households who will adopt formal 
savings simply when provided access, without receiving any marketing or awareness about 
the benefits of savings. These households become the first customers of OIBM’s new banking 
service. 
Early adopters are the individuals who are most likely to respond positively to 
marketing and promotions of the new technology. Moore identifies them as individuals who 
“find it easy to understand, and appreciate the benefits of a new technology”. In our study, 
6 Moore explains the gaps between each group of customer based on the fact that each 
group has different needs and wants. He suggests product improvements in order to 
“jump” to acquire next customer group. For the purpose of this paper, however, we will 
restrict ourselves to the understanding of who the “initial adopters” are and where they 
stand on the savings adoption life cycle. We will not discuss how we need to alter 
features of formal savings to meet the desired requirements of each group. 7  
                                                        
early adopters are the households who are most likely to adopt formal savings accounts when 
told about its features and benefits. They provide the first positive responses to the marketing 
campaigns of financial institutions – be it awareness programs, public meetings, in-person 
information sessions, etc. In our experiment, the treatment is this exposure to the marketing 
and informational campaigns provided by the OIBM bank. Therefore, the early adopters in 
our sample are households that adopted formal savings due to treatment.  
The next three groups Early Majority, Late Majority, and Laggards ask for much 
more than information before promising commitment. In our study, the Early Majority are 
poor households that do not trust the financial institution immediately. They require time and 
feedback from others around them to adopt savings themselves. They Late Majority 
households will take even more time and additional confirmation on the new technology to be 
convinced of its worth. Lastly, Laggards consists of poor households that choose not to adopt 
savings for personal, social, or economic reasons. They are not responsive to any marketing 
or promotional strategies and do not buy into the technology.  
A closer look at household characteristics can provide a clear idea of what group 
the household falls into. In this paper, I aim to identify households that fall into the innovators 
and the early adopters groups of formal savings. I call these two groups the initial adopters of 
formal savings. In addition to identifying the initial adopters group of households, I also take 
a look at how household characteristics affect the likelihood of owning a savings account, and 
the amounts saved in those accounts. Further, I also contribute to the existing literature in this 
field by including specifics of the household composition previously overlooked. These 
include the number of adults, the number of dependents, and the literacy amongst all 
household members. 
8  
I believe that it is important for savings providers to exclusively cater to the initial 
adopters of formal savings because they are their first promising pool of customers. The 
innovators adopt savings account without any marketing or promotional demands, thereby 
making it a low cost effort for the savings provider to reach out to them. The early adopters 
can give savings providers “their first big break” and “gain exceptional visibility” in a 
community, as worded by Moore. Especially amongst poor communities, it has become 
important for institutions to establish trust and popularity in the community to gain traction. 
Targeting the initial adopters of formal savings can reward institutions with both. 
9  
II. Empirical Setting and Sample Data 
 
The data for this study is pulled from household surveys held in Malawi over two 
years, 2008 and 2010. The field evidence was run by the Opportunity International Bank of 
Malawi (OIBM) and funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation7. Considering the fact 
that households in the research area were far from formal banking services, OIBM spurred an 
intervention by driving a “bank on wheels” closer to these households. A mobile van-bank 
made six stops at trading centers across the Mchinji, Lilongwe, and Dedza districts of Central 
Malawi, bringing reachable access to formal savings to a sample of over 2,000 households.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first part of this section, I will introduce you to Malawi – its population and 
economic statistics. In the second part of this section, I will walk you through the details of 
the sample data and the methodology of this data collection. In the last part, I will define the 
variables included in this study.  
7 Field evidence was collected in collaboration with Wadonda Consult, the survey team in 
Malawi that collected data, and the IRIS/FSA team (at the University of Maryland, MD) 
that reviewed the data. 
Figure 2: Individuals make transactions at 
the van bank service provided by OIBM. 
Photo credit to Jeffrey A. Flory 
Figure 3: One of the six stops of the van 
bank service provided by OIBM.  
Photo credit to Jeffrey A. Flory 
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Malawi’s bleak economic status puts a dent on its social development but makes 
it an attractive destination for a microfinance analysis. Malawi ranks high on the “World’s 
worst economies in 2012” by Forbes and the “World’s worst economies in 2013” by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Malawi is one of the most densely populated and poorest 
developing countries in the world. Being landlocked, Malawi is neither blessed with a 
commercially productive geography nor has it significantly developed its institutions to spur 
economic growth. Consequentially, per capita GDP and poverty statistics are not in favor of 
the country:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
Table 1.1: GDP and per Capita GDP estimates for Malawi, for the years 2008, 2010, and 2014. 
†IMF staff estimates. Source: World Economic Outlook Database, IMF Data and Statistics 
 
Given that Malawi’s population is on the rise, the IMF estimates that the per 
capita GDP might decline in future years. Within the two years of the panel data collected for 
this study (2008-2010), the per capita GDP of Malawi has increased by 19.22%, thanks to the 
positive increase in population accompanied by a positive increase in GDP. Unfortunately, the 
country’s GDP growth and population are not expected to go hand in hand. In 2014, the IMF 
estimates the per capita GDP to decrease by 30.89% compared to 2010. Currently, more than 
half of Malawi’s population lives under the poverty line (defined at PPP US$1.25 per day).  
According to 2010 the Human Development Report by the United Nations, 66.7% 
 GDP (USD Billions) Per capita GDP (USD) 
2008 4.278 288.078 
2010 5.397 343.454 
2014 4.178† 237.344† 
11 
 
of Malawi’s population falls under the poverty line8. The same report states that the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and the Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of Malawi were 
0.413 and 0.334 respectively, placing it under the Low Human Development list of countries. 
This implies that in 2010, when the household survey collection concluded, Malawi ranked on 
the lower end for life expectancy, education, and standard of living. The low ranking of 
Malawi comes with no surprise given that food shortage, corruption, increasing population, 
and HIV/AIDS infection are prevalent conditions of the rural regions.  
The issues discussed above not only affect the economic health of Malawi as a 
nation, but also affect the ability of poor households in Malawi to rise above the $1.25 per day 
poverty line. Let us predict the future of these households with the ongoing economic and 
social trends in Malawi. According to the Central Intelligence Agency report (2013), 65.3% 
of the population in Malawi is aged between 0-24years and the median age of the entire 
population is 17.3. We are, therefore, looking at a nation with a strong, young labor force. 
This can prove to be a blessing to the economy of Malawi, but a curse to the status of each 
individual household. On one hand, more youth can provide more productive labor on 
agricultural fields and more produce available for trade, thereby increasing the value of 
expected GDP for the country. In fact, Malawi’s President Joyce Banda, in an interview with 
the Wall Street Journal (2012), said that she wants the country’s economic foundation to 
move from aid to trade, leveraging on the agricultural produce of the country’s labor. On the 
8 Human Development Report. in United Nations Development Programme [database 
online]. 2013 Available from www.hdr.undp.org. The HDI is based primarily on 
international data from the United Nations Population Division, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics 
(UIS) and the World Bank. 
12 
 
                                                     
other hand, a heavier young population is expected to boost population growth. According to 
the 2010 estimates, the mean age of a mother at first birth is 18.9 and according to the 2013 
estimate, there is an average of 5.26 children born to each woman. These statistics indicate 
increasing household sizes in the near future in Malawi. 
 Such demographic forecasts are worrisome because increasing household size 
can thwart savings as having more children creates more financial dependence, at least in the 
initial years. Further, Malawi’s domestic economy is not enough strong to foster 
entrepreneurial ventures or business development within poor households. According to the 
latest Enterprise Surveys (2009) in the Business Environment Snapshot for Malawi conducted 
by the World Bank, access to finance is the main obstacle in starting a business in Malawi. In 
fact, the report states that 40.1% of firms have a line of credit or loans from financial 
institutions. Therefore, microfinance intervention has become a stent to the flow of liquid 
savings and loans in Malawi. 
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i. Sample and Data Collection 
 
 
Malawi is divided into three regions: Northern, Central, and Southern. This study 
restricts itself to the Mchinji, Lilongwe, and Dedza districts of Central Malawi. The focus of 
this paper’s analysis looks at the household-level patterns of savings. 46% of the households 
surveyed come from the Dedza district, 30% from the Mchinji district, and 24% from the 
Lilongwe district. The following table provides some comparative insights into these districts: 
 
Table 1.2: Poor population statistics for districts of Central Malawi. 
Source: Malawi National Statistical Office, Integrated household survey, 2004-2005 
 
As mentioned earlier, the data consists of over 2,000 household surveys 
conducted at baseline February to April 2008 and endline February to April 2010. It is 
important to note that this time period was the pre-harvest “hungry” season during which 
revenues from agricultural activities might be low and vulnerability to food shocks might be 
high. About 93% of the sampled households engage in farming, 66% of which also raise 
livestock and 44% work as wage laborers. Over 97% of the sampled households participated 
9 Poverty Line defined at MWK 16,165 (USD 146.28) per person per year, and Ultra 
Poverty Line defined at MWK 10,029 (USD 90.76) per person per year, by the National 
Statistical Office of Malawi. Currency conversion rates for 2005 [1 MWK = approx. 
0.009049 USD]. 
 Poor Population9 
(2005) 
Ultra-Poor Population3 
(2005) 
Average Household 
Size (2008) 
Mchinji 59.60% 30.40% 4.7 
Lilongwe 37.50% 11.70% 4.5 
Dedza 54.60% 20.90% 4.3 
14 
 
                                                     
in survey interviews, which lasted between 1.5 to 2.5 hours. The same households were 
interviewed in both years, and no monetary incentive or gifts were offered for the interview. 
The survey instrument was a 30-page structured questionnaire focused on household 
demographics, economic activities, poverty status, food security, asset ownership, salary, use 
of financial services, shocks experienced in the past, insurance mechanisms, and social 
capital. The questionnaire was translated into the local language Chichewa, and then back into 
English as well to confirm accurate translation. Some sources used to design the questionnaire 
were the World Bank Living Standard Measurement Surveys and USAID food-security 
questionnaires. The questionnaire was designed by the IRIS Center at University of Maryland 
as part of an impact assessment of the OIBM’s “bank on wheels”. The bank brought its 
services closer to the villages by making weekly stops at six trading centers in the research 
area.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The map+ illustrates the route of the van bank service provided by OIBM. The red 
triangles represent an approximate location of the six stops. +Created with Google Maps 
 
The data was collected in order to analyze the impact of banking services 
provided by the Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM) in the rural parts of 
15 
 
Malawi. At the baseline, households in the research area had very low rates of financial 
inclusion. Only 11.55% of the 2,451 sampled households had at least one formal savings 
account, and about 14.7% of the sample reported using a formal savings account, formal loan, 
or both. To address this issue, OIBM provided financial services (formal savings and credit 
options) through a mobile van-bank which drove closer to sampled villages, bringing banking 
closer to households. Each of the six bank stops was made on the same day of every week, 
usually the “market day” so that individuals could conveniently deposit cash earned from 
sales the same day.  
Amongst the Mchinji, Lilongwe, and Dedza districts of Central Malawi, the data 
was collected in units of 2-4 village clusters called “Enumeration Areas” (EAs). A total of 
118 EAs were sampled. The Enumeration Areas were categorized by distance from the 
mobile van-bank (under 5 km, 5-10 km, or 10-12 km) and by population (high or low). 
Following this categorization, at least two EAs were randomly sampled from each population-
distance group. Data sampling was divided based on a matched-pair design, where one 
member of each pair was randomly assigned to community-level information-treatment, and 
the other member was assigned to the control group. In total, 59 village clusters were 
randomly assigned to the treatment group, and an equal amount to the control group. To 
minimize spill-over effects from information-treated areas to non-treated areas, the sample 
was scrutinized to maintain a minimum distance of 3 km between the two EAs in any pair. 
Finally, within each treatment village cluster, the intervention coordinators randomly chose 
households to interview. This randomization consisted of writing each household’s number on 
a piece of paper, folding it up, dropping it into a bag, and having a member of the community 
draw blindly from the bag. The interview was held at both baseline and endline, and followed 
16 
 
the questionnaire designed by the IRIS center.  
During the two year gap between the baseline and endline (April 2008 to March 
2010), OIBM adopted a Randomized Encouragement Trail technique to provide intensive 
marketing and awareness of its financial services to the treatment group in the sample10. 
Marketing techniques involved radio, public meetings, and “personal marketing” where 
information was delivered to clients’ doorsteps. OIBM and the IRIS center designed 
information campaigns that explained the terms, conditions, and application processes of 
opening savings accounts to the randomly assigned treatment. Promotional materials also 
included t-shirts, fliers, posters, and referral cards. Village clusters that were assigned 
treatment were exposed to these promotional campaigns, and village clusters in the control 
group were not provided any promotional information. In section VII, we will examine how 
such campaigns altered the effect of household characteristics on the probability of savings 
adoption by differentiating between the effects of control and treatment groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 For a complete report on the awareness and marketing techniques, please refer to: 
Nagarajan, Geetha, and S. Ademan. "Does Intense Marketing Increase Outreach? The 
Case of Opportunity International Bank in Rural Malawi." College Park, MD: IRIS 
Center, Assessing the Impact of Innovation Grants in Financial Services Project (2010). 
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ii. Data Description: Variables in focus 
 
 
I use a linear probability model to analyze the effects of household characteristics 
on the probability of the adoption of a formal savings account. The data set used for this study 
includes a broad spectrum of variables: from use of credit or adoption of savings, to past 
experiences with food or health shocks, to individual and household level demographics. For 
the purpose of this paper, I restrict my analysis to inclusion of the following variables:  
 
Yi = α0 + α1 (Gender)i + α2 (Age) i + α3 (Age2) i + α4 (Married) i + α5 (Literacy) i +  
β1 (Salaried members) i + β2 (Literate members) i + β3 (Business) i + β4 (Distance) i +         
β5 (Cellphone) i + ϒ1 (Adults) i + ϒ2 (Children) i + ɛ 
Table 1.3: Regression Equation  
 
 
The list of independent variables included in this equation is mostly consistent 
with the literature examining formal savings. However, I extend the analysis by adding 
additional variables (such as literacy of the entire household), and disaggregating the 
household size variable. 
 The dependent variable is the use of a formal savings account.  A “savings 
account” refers to any device used by the household to store monetary savings. At the 
location studied, households have several options to store their cash. In this study, I 
include the use of “formal” savings at any organization, including the five commercial 
banks (OIBM, National Bank, Standard Bank, NBS Bank, First Merchant Bank), the two-
para-statal banks (Malawi Rural Finance Company and Malawi Savings Bank), the 
savings and credit cooperatives, and the NGOs in the area. Other “informal” savings 
18 
 
options include storing cash at home, at a relative’s place, or in a Rotating credit and 
Savings Association (ROSCA).  At the baseline, only 11.5% sampled households held 
formal saving accounts, while at the endline this number rose to 16.5%.  
In addition to the use of formal savings, I will also analyze the effects of 
household characteristics on the amount saved in these formal accounts. This accounts 
for the second dependent variable included in this study. It would be interesting to see if 
the same household characteristics show different effects on savings adoption and on the 
amounts saved. This might raise interesting questions regarding adoption and savings 
behavior, which are discussed in sections V and VI. 
I focus on three categories of household characteristics in this study. First, I 
include variables pertaining to the household head (Gender, Age, and Married). These 
variables can affect the household’s decision to adopt savings, and the amount of savings 
in that account as well. Several other studies have looked the effect variables on the 
adoption and usage of financial services (Dupas, Robinson, Green, Keats (2012); Schaner 
(2011); Ackah, Acquah; Woodruff, Martinez (2008); Prina (2013)). These variables are 
shown as α1 (Gender)i, α2 (Age)i, α3 (Age2)i, α4 (Married) i, and α5 (Literacy)i in Table 
1.3. The Gender variable takes the value 1 for male household heads and 0 for female 
household heads. The Age variables reflect the expected diminishing effect of the 
increasing age of the household head. The Married variable takes the value 1 for married 
household heads and 0 otherwise. Lastly, the literacy variable refers to the ability of a 
household head to read Chichewa, which takes the value 1 if the ability holds true.  
Second, I include variables pertaining to all household members, not necessarily 
to the head. To account for the wealth of a household, I include a continuous variable for 
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the number of household members who are salaried, a dummy variable for ownership of 
at least one business, and a dummy variable for the ownership of a functional cellphone. I 
believe that these three characteristics highlight the wealth level of a household because 
we can expect wealthier households to have salaried members, at least one business, or a 
functional cellphone. On the other hand, the poorest of the sampled households might not 
exhibit any of these three characteristics. For instance, at the baseline, only 13.09% of the 
sampled households have a working cellphone, indicating that a majority of the sample is 
too poor to afford them. Further, of the 2461 sampled households, 73.69% do not own 
any businesses, and 22.24% own one business, and the remaining 4.07% own two to four 
businesses. Lastly, I include a distance variable to demonstrate the convenience of having 
formal savings options at arm’s length, or the inconvenience of having it far away. 
Third, I include variables explain the household size. To look at the household 
composition as a determinant of savings adoption, I divide the household size into Adults 
and Children. These are shown as ϒ1 (Adults)i and ϒ2 (Children)i in Table 1.3. The 
adults are aged above 17 and are assumed working. The children are aged 17 or below 
and are assumed financially dependent. I find that it is important to split household size 
into number of adults and number of children in order to accurately understand that 
effects of household literacy and household size within our sample. This rationale is 
discussed further in the section III.  
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III. Effects of Household Size and Literacy 
The importance of splitting up household size into number of adults and number 
of children 
 
A few studies have analyzed the effects of household size on the adoption or 
usage of financial services, be it formal or informal savings, though the results have been 
ambiguous (Ackah, Acquah; Prina (2013); Cole, Sampson, Zia (2011)). For instance, 
Ackah and Acquah find that household size has a positive and significant effect on the 
use of formal financial services. On the other hand, Prina (2013) finds that the estimated 
effect of household size is negative (but insignificant) on the take-up of savings, and 
negative and significant on usage of savings accounts. Through this study’s findings, I 
believe that breaking up the composition of household size into number of adults and 
number of children gives a clearer picture of how the variables affect savings.  
Table 2 compares the effect of splitting up household size into adults and 
children, with different literacy variables at the baseline. Column 1 shows the effect of 
splitting the household size variable into number of adults and number of children. Here, 
the literacy variable is a dummy (with value 1 if anyone in the household can read) that 
considers the literacy of any one individual in the household. Each additional adult in the 
household increases the likelihood of having formal savings by 1.8 percentage points 
(significant at the .05 level), and each additional child increases the likelihood by 1.1 
percentage points (significant at the .05 level). These results are similar to the effect of 
household size taken as an aggregate variable, shown in column 2. Results show that 
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household size increases the likelihood of having a savings account by 1.27 percentage 
points, significant at the .01 level. 
However, when I change the literacy variable to a continuous variable that 
accounts for the increase in number of household members who can read, the effects are 
in sharp contrast. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 illustrate these two effects. First, column 4 
shows that household size has a negative and statistically insignificant effect on the 
probability of savings. If household size increases by one member, the probability of 
having formal savings decreases by 0.55 percentage points. Second, column 3 shows that 
number of adults has a negative yet statistically significant effect. For every additional 
adult in the household, the probability of having a savings account decreases by 2.7 
percentage points, significant at the .05 level. 
In Table 2, the continuous literacy variable in columns 3 and 4 accounts for the 
marginal effect of adding literate members into the household, as opposed to the dummy 
literacy variable in columns 1 and 2 which does not. By accounting for the literacy of all 
household members (and not just one member, as in columns 1 and 2), we notice two 
important effects. First, every additional literate adult in the household increases the 
likelihood of savings by 5.49 percentage points, significant at the .01 level. This might 
suggest that the more members in the household who can read, the more people who can 
understand and go through the process of opening a formal account. Second, every 
additional adult in the household (literate or not) reduces the likelihood of savings by 2.7 
percentage points. This might be the case because increasing the number of adults living 
under one roof, despite their ability to read Chichewa, may put more strain on earnings as 
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expenditures may increase. There might be more burden on expenditures if each 
additional adult in the household is not earning or spending more than he or she earns.  
 Another important point to consider is that if we compare columns 2 and 4 in 
Table 2, we can see the effect of household size alter significantly as we change the way 
in which we control for literacy. In column 2, if we consider a dummy variable for 
anyone in the household who can read, the household size has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood of having a savings account If a household has at least 
one member who can read Chichewa (this could be the household head as well), the 
probability of having a savings account increases by an estimated 1.27 percentage points, 
significant at the .01 level. This result is consistent with Ackah and Acquah’s finding that 
household size increases the chances of having a savings account by a positive and 
statistically significant effect, when we account for the literacy of only one member in the 
household (in their case, the household head). However, when I change the literacy 
variable to a continuous one (accounting for every additional literate household member), 
the effect of the household size becomes negative and statistically insignificant. This 
underlines a concern that Ackah and Acquah’s finding might have been due to an omitted 
variable bias of not accounting for all household members’ literacy. It might be possible 
that if they had included a literacy variable for the entire household, the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the household size might have fallen to a negative effect.  
 Following the same path, let us look at the effects of different literacy variables 
on the estimated magnitude and significance of the effect of number of adults and number 
of children in a household. Columns 1 through 6 in Table 3 illustrates the effect of 
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changing literacy variables on the significance of household size variables (number of 
adults and number of children). In particular, pay attention to the changes in effects of 
number of adults and number of children as we change the literacy variables. 
As we look across the results in columns 1 through 6, we notice three important 
patterns. First, all literacy variables are statistically significant in their respective 
regressions. Second, number of adults and number of children have a positive effect for 
dummy literacy variable regressions. Third, number of adults and number of children 
have a negative effect for continuous literacy variable regressions. 
For regressions with a dummy literacy variable, there is an increase in the 
likelihood of having formal savings if anyone in the household can read Chichewa. The 
literacy variable is a dummy; therefore, it will take the value 1 if at least one member in 
the household can read Chichewa. Despite additional members being able to read 
Chichewa, the dummy variable keeps a value of 1. Therefore, increasing the number of 
adults who are literate does not affect the literacy variable. Due to the correlation 
between the literacy and household size variable, the negative effect of increasing the 
number of individuals under one roof is not captured by either variable. This hints at an 
omitted variable bias which occurs due to the absence of a continuous variable to capture 
the literacy of all household members. This may justify the positive effect of both literacy 
and number of adults variables (as seen in columns 1, 3, and 5). 
For regressions with a continuous literacy variable, as we increase the number of 
adults who can read Chichewa, the literacy variable captures a positive effect on the 
probability of having a savings account. For every additional literate member in the 
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household, the likelihood of having a savings account increases by a positive and 
significant number in columns 2, 4, and 6. In these columns, as we increase the number 
of literate adults, we are also adding more people to that particular household. Columns 
2, 4, and 6 capture two outcomes of adding members to a household. First, increasing 
number of literate adults increases the probability of savings (by the statistically 
significant coefficient of the literacy variable). This may be explained on the basis that 
more members in the household should be able to open formal savings for the entire 
household because they can read through the necessary documentation and process. 
Second, increasing the number of adults decreases the probability of savings (by the 
statistically significant negative coefficient of number of adults). One rationale behind 
this effect is that increasing the number of adults increases household size, which might 
increase expenses and lower the probability of having formal savings.  
In conclusion, the regression in column 6 represents an appropriate combination 
of literacy and household variables applicable to this study. All other variables previously 
mentioned (including cellphone, business ownership, distance from the EA, etc) will be 
added into this regression for analysis. Since this paper is looking at the composition of 
the entire household, I include literacy variables that show the ability of all members in 
the household to read Chichewa. In a case where members of the household (other than 
the household head) can read Chichewa, they may be able to better understand the 
benefits of savings through the bank’s marketing campaigns. These members can in turn 
influence the household head to adopt savings. But, if the household head can read 
Chichewa in the first place, he or she might want to adopt savings without the influence 
of other household members. If the household head can read Chichewa, there is an 
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“added plus” to the probability of the take up of savings. Therefore, I include a 
continuous variable for the number of literate members in the household (except the 
head) and a dummy variable Literacy of the household head.  
I use a linear probability model to analyze the effects of various household 
characteristics on the likelihood of already having formal savings, the probability of 
adopting formal savings (post treatment), and on the amounts saved in formal savings. 
Yi = α0 + α1 (Gender)i + α2 (Age) i + α3 (Age2) i + α4 (Married) i + α5 (Literacy) i +             
β1 (Salaried members) i + β2 (Literate members) i + β3 (Business) i + β4 (Distance) i +        
β5 (Cellphone) i + ϒ1 (Adults) i + ϒ2 (Children) i + ɛ 
Table 1.3: Regression Equation  
As shown above, the regression equation includes three categories of independent 
variables: 
• Characteristics of the household head: age, gender, marital status, and literacy. 
These variables are preceded by coefficients α1, α2, α3, α4, and α5. 
• Non-head characteristics of the household: number of salaried members in the 
household, number of literate members in the household, ownership of business, 
distance from EA, ownership of a cellphone. These variables are preceded by 
coefficients β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5.. 
• Household size: number of adults, number of children. These variables are 
preceded by coefficients ϒ1, and ϒ2. 
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IV. Household Determinants of Having Formal Savings  
 
Across the baseline (2008) and the endline (2010) in Table 4, we can see a range 
of similarities and differences amongst independent variables and the probability that a 
household owns a savings account. Let us take a closer look in the three categories of 
regressors. Table 4 reports the likelihood of having a formal savings account at the 
baseline (2008) and at the endline (2010) as determined by household characteristics. 
Characteristics of the household head 
In Table 4, the effect of the household head’s age on the probability of having a 
savings account is negligible in 2008 and 2010. Although in 2010 the estimated effect of 
age is higher than the effect in 2008, the coefficients are not statistically significant. This 
result is in contrast with Ackah and Acquah’s finding that the effect of the age of the 
household head on using formal financial services is positive and statistically significant. 
I find that the effect is indeed opposite; negative and not statistically significant in both 
2008 and 2010. Ackah and Acquah also note that in Ghana, the sampled average age of 
household heads with formal savings is 47. I find that the mean age of individuals with a 
formal savings account in Malawi is 42, which underlines a difference in our sample data.  
On the other hand, the gender of the household head has notably different effects 
in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, if the household head is male, the probability of having a 
savings account increases by 8.6 percentage points. This result is statistically significant 
at the .01 significance level. The finding that male headed households are more likely to 
have a formal savings account is consistent with other literature in the field of 
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microfinance11. As illustrated in figure 3, 94.7% of the households that owned a savings 
account were male headed in 2008, and 90.8% of them were male headed in 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Sampled household heads’ gender ratios for 2008 and 2010 
 
The gender ratio is similar in the sample for both years, tipping more towards 
male headed households. A male headed household is a positive predictor of owning a 
formal savings account in the sample. One reason behind male household heads being 
more inclined towards formal savings (as opposed to informal savings) is that formal 
savings allows them  to exercise self-discipline on temptation expenditures. If there is a 
cost attached to formal savings withdrawals, men who tend to spend “cash in hand” 
11 Ackah and Acquah find the male household heads were 0.7 percentage points more 
likely to use formal financial services.                                                                   
Ackah, Charles, and Adjoa Acquah. Which households use which financial services? 
Evidence from Ghana.  
Dupas, Green, Keats, and Robinson find that amongst unbanked individuals, men were 
3.9 percentage points more likely to open an account compared to women.          
Dupas, Pascaline, Sarah Green, Anthony Keats, and Jonathan Robinson. 2012. 
Challenges in Banking the Rural Poor: Evidence from Kenya's Western Province.  
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might reduce their expenditures12. Note that this particular regression shows that male 
headed households were more likely to have a formal savings account, but does not 
necessarily comment on the usage or amounts saved in these accounts. Therefore, it is 
possible that more households with male heads have accounts, and at the same time, more 
households with female heads have higher savings or frequency of deposits and 
withdrawals. If this is the case, male heads who opt for formal savings with an aim of 
saving more and spending less, do not stick to that aim. We will further examine the role 
of gender in take up of savings account and the actual amount in sections V and VI. 
The magnitude of the effect and significance of the gender variable differs across 
the baseline and the endline. The probability of a household having a savings account 
was higher for households headed by a male in both years, the effect being positive and 
significant in 2008, and being positive and not significant in 2010. In 2010, if the 
household head is male, the probability of having a formal savings account increases by 
1.2 percentage points. This result is not statistically significant. The same effect is almost 
12 "These constraints are often such that fees or restrictions on access to liquidity may 
actually help increase storage of savings. First, individuals may have to contend with 
time inconsistent preferences - if the temptation to spend out of readily accessible savings 
is too great, individuals may prefer to store resources in an account that is costly to 
access" (Banerjee and Mallainathan 2010; Laibson 1997). 
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2010. The Shape of Temptation: 
Implications for the Economic Lives of the Poor. 
Laibson, David. 1997. Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112 (2): 443-78. 
 
Prina (2013) agrees: "A fully liquid account might have advantages and disadvantages 
for the poor. On the one hand, poor households might value a savings that is fully liquid 
so that they can dip into their savings to address a shock. On the other hand, liquidity 
might be an obstacle for those exercising self-control.” 
Prina, Silvia. 2013. Banking the poor via savings accounts: Evidence from a field 
experiment. Case Western Reserve, Working Paper.  
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7 times more in 2008, significant at the .01 level. One rational behind this sharp 
difference in the effect of gender might be explained by the contribution of treatment 
effects. The informational campaigns provided to treated households (included in 2010, 
but not in 2008) might have been more successful in female headed households. We will 
discuss the effect of treatment on gender effects in section VII. 
Further, the ability of the household head to read Chichewa has a positive effect 
across the baseline and the endline. However, if the household head can read Chichewa, 
the probability of having a saving account increases by a higher percentage in 2010 than 
in 2008. In 2008, the household head’s ability to read Chichewa increases the probability 
by 5.7 percentage points, while in 2010, it increases the probability by 8.6 percentage 
points. Both these results are statistically significant (at the .01 level) and are in 
agreement with Woodruff and Martinez’s findings on literacy. In a sample of 3472 
observations, Woodruff and Martinez (2008) find that the likelihood of having an account 
is 31.6 percentage points higher if the head had 12+ years of schooling and 13.7 
percentage points higher is he or she could speak the indigenous language. Woodruff and 
Martinez’ results are statistically significant at .01 level as well.  
Non-head characteristics of the household 
The ability of the household members to read Chichewa has a similar effect in 
both years. One reason that the ability of household members to read Chichewa might 
matter is that the bank’s awareness program would be most effective if an individual can 
read about the benefits of savings and can go through the necessary documentation 
required to open a savings account. If there are several members in the household who 
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can read Chichewa, it shows the household’s investment in education, which in turn can 
account for higher salaries and savings. In addition, it is safe to assume that the savings of 
a particular household are managed by its head; therefore the literacy of the household 
head is very important. In a case where members of the household (other than the 
household head) can read Chichewa, they will understand the benefits of savings through 
the bank’s marketing campaigns. These members can in turn influence the household 
head to adopt savings. But, if the household head can read Chichewa in the first place, he 
or she might want to adopt savings without the influence of other household members. If 
the household head can read Chichewa, there is an “added plus” to the probability of take 
up of savings. The results corroborate this notion. The effect of household head’s ability 
to read is a statistically significant and positive, on top of the effect of the household 
members’ ability to read Chichewa.  
At the baseline and the endline, the effect of each additional member who can 
read Chichewa is positive and significant at the .01 level. For every additional member in 
the household who can read Chichewa, the probability of having a savings account 
increases by approximately 3 percentage points. This result may suggest that as we 
increase the number of literate members in the household, we increase the likelihood that 
the household will respond positively to the financial knowledge and the benefits of 
financial savings. In addition, it hints at the household’s investment in education13. We 
can expect such a household to use a savings account in order to save for education 
investment. This fact is corroborated by two explanations: first, a plausible assumption 
13 Prina (2013) found that as the poor open savings accounts, their investments in health 
and education increases. 
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that the ability to read Chichewa would lead to a better understanding of savings benefits 
and second, Shawn, Thomas, and Zia’s finding (2011) that financial literacy promotes 
asset accumulation.  
Along the same path, ownership of a working cellphone has similar effects in 
2008 and 2010. With both coefficients bring statistically significant, the probability of 
having a savings account increases by approximately 25 percentage points if the 
household owns a cellphone in working condition. Given the high percentage effect, this 
variable is an important predictor of the household’s use of a savings account. 
I expect that owning a business gives the household another reason adopt savings 
– to accumulate savings and invest in the business. Therefore, I expect the correlation 
between this variable and savings to be positive. Aggarwal, Klapper, & Singer (2012) 
also find that poor households opt for microcredit for expansion of existing businesses. In 
areas where microcredit is not as accessible, poor households are motivated to save in 
order to expand their businesses. It is interesting to note that if the household owns a 
business, the effect is positive and significant in 2008 (at the .1 level), but negative and 
not significant in 2010 on the probability of owning a savings account. At the baseline, 
the result is consistent with other findings (Woodruff, Martinez (2008); Cole, Thompson, 
Zia (2011))14. Households open accounts to save for future investment or expansion of 
14 Woodruff and Martinez (2008) find that if the account holder owns an agricultural or a 
non-agricultural business, his or her probability of having a savings account 
increases by 5.2% and 5.6% respectively. These results statistically significant. 
Woodruff, Christopher, and José Martínez. 2008. Assessing changes in household 
access to financial services in Mexico: An analysis of the BANSEFI/SAGARPA 
panel survey 2004 -2007. (Footnote continued on next page…) 
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their existing business. What affects the amounts actually saved in these accounts is 
discussed in the next section.  
At the endline, however, we see that business ownership has a negative and not a 
significant effect on the probability of having a savings account. In 2008, 99 households 
who owned at least one business had a formal savings account. This number reduced to 
96 in 2010. This drop could have been due to several reasons. Perhaps, some households 
chose to opt out of formal savings or increased their expenditures more and opted out of 
savings overall. Further, once the bank went mobile and more accessible at the end line, 
having a business might not matter as much in determining the usage of formal savings. 
In 2008, 35% of the banked households had a business, and in 2010, 27% of the banked 
households had a business. This drop in the number of banked households with a 
business suggests that once the bank went mobile, and came closer to the villages, all 
households (regardless of business ownership) had easier access to savings. Whereas, 
initially when the bank was not mobile, we can assume that wealthier households (i.e. 
households with businesses) could make the trip to the bank for savings. Once the bank 
went mobile, the effect of business was no longer statistically significant, and in fact, 
quite close to zero.  
 
 Cole, Sampson, and Zia find the ownership of a non-farm enterprise increases the 
probability of the household owning a formal bank account. This result is positive 
and statistically significant for the sample in Indonesia. Cole, Shawn, Thomas 
Sampson, and Bilal Zia. 2011. Prices or knowledge? What drives demand for 
financial services in emerging markets? The Journal of Finance 66 (6): 1933-67.  
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Household Size 
In context of household size, I expect the correlation between the number of 
adults to the probability of savings take up to be positive, because the more the number of 
adults, the more earning hands in the household, and thus the higher the probability of 
savings. On the other hand, I expect the same correlation in the case of number of 
children to be negative because the more the dependents in the household, the more the 
expenses, and the less the probability of savings. The results how that the number of 
children has a negligible and statistically insignificant effect on the probability of having 
a savings account both at baseline and at endline. However, the effect of the number of 
adults differs in 2008 and in 2010. In 2008, the effect of having more adults in the 
household is negative and statistically insignificant, but in 2010, the same effect is 
positive and significant. 
In 2008, before OIBM started a van-bank drive, poor households in the research 
area may not have had easy access to financial services due to far distances from the bank 
site. Financial services do not reach out to every village and members of a poor 
household would have to travel by foot to go to the bank. In this case, households with 
more adults may not choose to make the inconvenient and time consuming walk to a 
bank branch. Further, if a household has high number of adults, they may not want a 
savings account far from them because they want their savings to be within their reach. 
We can expect that the more the adults in a household, the more the consumption of cash. 
Therefore, if a household with more adults held a savings account, they would require 
routinely transactions to meet their consumption. That said, a household with more adults 
might choose to keep cash at home or at a relative’s place. By keeping cash within reach, 
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these households not have the inconvenience of traveling to a make a bank deposit or 
withdrawal far away from their village. Therefore, if a household has more adults, they 
might accumulate their savings at home and feel a much lesser need for a formal savings 
account that is at a far distance. This behavior might explain the negligible and 
insignificant effect of number of adults on the probability of having a savings account at 
the baseline. Having more adults in a household may not matter at the baseline because 
the bank branch is too far to store savings. 
By 2010, however, OIBM was providing banking services much closer to the 
household’s reach. Through a van bank that made six stops at trading centers, OIBM 
literally drove people’s savings deposits closer to their village. The convenience of 
having a bank closer to the village allows for routinely transactions and deposits. 
Households with more adults can open a savings account and make transactions much 
faster. For a household with more adults, the incentive to open a savings account was not 
only the convenience of the bank, but also the promise of security from theft or loss. That 
said, the more the number of adults in a household, the more the likelihood of one of at 
least the members making an occasional trip to a trading center (a stop for the van bank). 
Therefore, adults who travel to run errands occasionally might be incentivized to open a 
savings account. Or, if these individuals were unaware of the van-bank, they might 
happen to stumble upon OIBM’s van bank services, and bring the information of this 
accessible bank back to their household. In either case, the more the number of adults in a 
household, the more the chances of having a formal savings account. Hence, at the 
endline, we see that each additional adult in the household increases the probability of 
having a savings account by 2.8 percentage points, significant at the .01 level. 
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V. Household Determinants of Having Formal Savings and 
Amounts Saved at the Baseline 
 
Table 5 compares the effect of various household characteristics on the likelihood 
of having a formal savings account to the actual amount saved (conditional on having 
formal savings) at the baseline. Note the difference in the number of observations. It 
shows that 278 households out of the 2395 sampled at the baseline report having a formal 
savings account. 
Characteristics of the Household head 
The ability of the household head to read Chichewa has a positive effect on the 
probability of having a savings account (with significance at .01 level), but a negligible 
effect on the amount saved. If the household head is literate enough to read, he or she is 
more likely to better understand the procedure of opening and using a savings account. 
Shawn, Thomas, and Zia (2011) find that across India and Indonesia, households exhibit 
an increase in demand for financial products with an increase in financial education. It is 
intuitive to expect that the ability to read or to have a basic education background may be 
important to comprehend financial education, and as a result, opt for financial products. 
However, our sample suggests that the ability to read is often not strong enough by itself 
to provoke the use of financial services. The evidence lies at the baseline, where 69% of 
the sampled household heads can read Chichewa, but only 11.55% of them have a formal 
savings account. This brings us to microfinance literature which suggests that several 
other social issues, such as lack of trust in the organization, unmet documentation 
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requirements or other factors might thwart even a literate household from choosing to 
have a savings account (Aggarwal, Klapper (2012); Dupas, Robinson (2009); Cole, 
Sampson, Zia (2011))15. These might help explain why only 283 households having a 
savings account at the baseline when 1697 households have a literate head in the sample.  
The gender and the marital status of the household head have different effects on 
the probability of having a savings account than on the amount saved. If the household 
head is a male, the household is 8.6 percentage points more likely to have a savings 
account, significant at the .01 level. However, amongst formal account owners, the 
significance of being a male household head disappears for the actual amount saved. This 
relates to past literature in microfinance looking at which gender saves more. There have 
been contradicting findings related to gender, mostly because several other factors 
besides gender affect savings amounts. Dupas & Robinson (2009) find that the average 
15 Aggarwal and Klapper write that unbanked individuals in developing countries might 
not opt for formal savings accounts due to lack of money, high costs of opening the 
account, distance from the bank, documentation requirements, or lack of trust in the 
institution.  
Aggarwal, Shilpa, and Leora Klapper. 2012. Designing government policies to expand 
financial inclusion: Evidence from around the world. Unpublished Working Paper, World 
Bank, Washington, DC.  
 
Dupas and Robinson find that savings accounts offered by savings cooperatives are not 
readily available because they are urban and employment based.  
Dupas, Pascaline, and Jonathan Robinson. 2009. Savings Constraints and Microenterprise 
Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya.  
 
Cole Shawn, Sampson Thomas, and Bilal Zia also discover in their experiments in India 
and Indonesia that financial literacy alone does not increase demand for financial 
products in the greater population. 
Cole, Shawn, Thomas Sampson, and Bilal Zia. 2011. Prices or knowledge? What drives 
demand for financial services in emerging markets? The Journal of Finance 66 (6): 1933-
67.  
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deposits for women were twice as high as the average deposits for men. Women (all of 
whom were market vendors) used their accounts more actively as well. On the contrary, 
in another study, Dupas, Keats, Green, and Robinson (2012) find that men had higher 
amounts in total and average savings deposits. We can infer that although gender might 
be an important determinant of who saves more, it is dependent on the circumstances 
(employment, social constraints, household size, etc) that affect gender’s role in 
determining the amount saved.  
Lastly, marital status of the household head has a positive and significant effect 
on the amount saved. If the household head is married, he or she may feel more 
responsible the family, including the dependents in the household. This behavior might 
encourage him or her to save more, thereby explaining the positive effect. One evidence 
for such behavior can be pulled from Dupas and Robinson’s field experiments in Kenya 
2009). Dupas and Robinson find that “having a joint account with spouse” has a positive 
effect on the “take-up and usage of a savings account” for both men and women. 
Therefore, households with married heads are more likely to save higher amounts in their 
savings accounts.  
Non-head characteristics of the household  
As seen in Table 5, the effect of number of members who can read Chichewa is 
positive and significant for both dependent variables. As an indicator of literacy, the 
ability to read may also imply that the household understands the financial benefits of 
saving. Hence, a household is more likely to save if more members can read. Also, the 
higher the number of household members who are salaried, the more the expected inflow 
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of income, and thus, the higher the expectation for savings. The effect of each additional 
salaried member in the household increases the likelihood of savings by 9.2 percentage 
points, significant at .01 level. Similarly, it increases the amounts saved by 14,531 
kwacha ($103.27), significant at .05 level16. The effect of ownership of a business flows 
along the same path. If a household owns at least one business, the probability of savings 
increases by 2.6 percentage points, significant at the .1 level. Note that the amount of 
savings is most affected the ownership of a business enterprise. If a household owns a 
business, its savings are boosted by 33,285 kwacha ($236.55), significant at the .05 level. 
These results are statistically significant and consistent with other studies17.  
The effect is similar if someone in the household owns a working cellphone: the 
probability of having a savings account increases by 26.2 percentage points (significant at 
.01 level) and the amount saved increases by 8,238 kwacha ($58.54). Given that the 
effect of having a functional cellphone is compelling, this result is useful for 
microfinance institutions that operate through mobile banking. Ownership of a working 
cellphone not only increases the possibility of having a savings account (thereby boosting 
financial inclusion) but also increases the amounts of savings in those accounts. On 
16 Currency conversion based on the exchange rate in April 2008. 1 MWK = 0. 
0.007107068 USD 
17 Cole, Sampson, and Zia find that demand for commitment savings increases by 
approximately 1 percentage point if the household owns a non-farm enterprise. This 
result is not statistically significant. In addition, they also find the ownership of a non-
farm enterprise increases the probability of the household owning a formal bank account. 
This result is positive and statistically significant for the Indonesia sample, and positive 
and not significant for the India sample. 
Cole Shawn, Sampson Thomas, and Bilal Zia: Prices or Knowledge? What Drives 
Demand for Financial Services in Emerging Markets? The Journal of Finance, Vol. LXVI 
#6 (December 2011) 
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challenge, however, in mobile banking amongst poor households is that only a limited 
number of individuals own cellphones in working conditions. In our sample, only 13.09% 
of the households own a cellphone that is functional. 
Household Size 
As discussed in section IV, the effect of having more adults in a household lowers 
the probability of having a savings account because of the cost of convenience. However, 
if a household already owns a savings account in 2008, the effect of having more adults 
under one roof is positive and not significant on the amount saved in that account. One 
rationale behind this finding is that the more the number of adults, the more labor in the 
household, and the more earnings we can expect. This would increase the amounts saved 
by the household in the savings account. This analysis brings about an interesting finding 
that the effect of each additional child within the household decreases the amount saved 
in the savings account by a 5923 kwacha (USD 42.09), significant at the .01 level. Since 
we expect children in these households to be dependent and non-earning, it is expected 
that their survival would drain out the savings of the households. Therefore, we can 
account for the negative effect on the amount saved.  
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VI. Household Determinants of Having Formal Savings and 
Amounts Saved at the Endline 
 
This analysis compares the effect of household characteristics on the probability 
of having a savings account, and on the actual amount saved (conditional on having a 
savings account) at the endline. Table 6 compares the effects of household characteristics 
on the likelihood of having a formal savings account and the amount saved in those 
accounts, at the endline. Note that observations in both columns of this table include the 
treatment groups (those exposed to the informational campaigns of the bank) and the 
control groups (those who did not receive any marketing). Table The fact that column 2 
only has 330 observations implies that at the endline, only 330 observations reported 
having a formal savings account. Compare this statistic to the number of observations in 
column 2 of Table 5 in section V. At the endline only 278 households reported having 
formal savings, while at the endline, this number rose to 330 (including both treatment 
and control groups).  
Characteristics of the Household head 
Amongst the variables focused on the household head, the gender and ability to 
read Chichewa present the most interesting results. If the household head is male, the 
probability of having a savings account is more, but the amount saved in the account is 
less. However, both these results are not statistically significant. Further, if the household 
head can read Chichewa, the household is more likely to have a savings account (by 8.6 
percentage points, significant at the .01 level) but less likely to have high amounts of 
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savings. Compare this result to column 1 in Table 5 of section V. We see a similar effect 
of the literacy variable in both 2008 and 2010. This may imply that literacy can be an 
important variable in understanding the importance of savings and going through the 
procedure of opening an account. However, given that the staple Malawian occupation is 
agriculture, it is possible that the ability to read Chichewa is not as useful as other factors 
(such as labor efficiency, energy, etc) in generating a larger inflow of agricultural 
income. Therefore, while literacy may predict the likelihood of having saving account, it 
might not increase the actual amount saved in the account.  
 
Non-head characteristics of the household  
Some characteristics of a household have a similar effect on the probability of 
having a savings account and on the amount saved. These include number of members 
who are salaried (positive and not significant), number of non-head members who can 
read Chichewa (positive), and distance from the bank (negative). Most importantly, if the 
household owns a cellphone in working condition, it is 25 percentage points more likely 
to have a savings account and expected to have 19,440 MWK more in savings. Both 
these results are statistically significant at the .01 level. 
On the other hand, ownership of a business has different effects on each of the 
dependent variables. If a household owns at least one business, it is 0.9 percentage points 
less likely to have a formal savings account, but on average, has 8,315 MWK more in 
savings if it already owns an account. Both these results, however, are not statistically 
significant.   
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Household Size 
In context of the household size, the number of children in the household does not 
significantly affect either of the dependent variables. For each additional child in the 
household, the probability of having a savings account increases by 0.1 percentage points 
and the amount saved in an account increases by 765.9 MWK (approx. 5.07 USD)18. On 
the contrary, number of adults has a contrasting effect. For every additional adult in the 
household, the probability of having a savings account increases by 2.8 percentage points 
(significant at the .01 level) but the amount saved decreases by a statistically insignificant 
value of 2,614 MWK (approx. 17.31 USD).  
This implies that the number of adults in a household matters more for predicting 
the likelihood of having a savings account than predicting the amount saved by a 
household, conditional on having an account.  Note that this result at the endline is 
opposite of the result we came across at the baseline. At the baseline, number of adults is 
a positive (yet, not statistically significant) predictor of the amount of savings. This 
difference in effect may be explained by the accessibility of the bank. By 2010, the bank 
went mobile and became more accessible, which could be an excuse for easier and faster 
withdrawals. Therefore, the more the number of adults in the house, the more the number 
of individuals who could access a savings account to withdraw money. Thus, having 
more adults in the household could have brought more amounts into savings account 
when the bank was less accessible, but it may have caused more withdrawals when the 
bank went mobile. It is important to keep in mind that these results are not statistically 
18 Currency conversion based on the exchange rate in April 2010. 1 MWK = 
0.0066225166 USD 
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significant in either 2008 or 2010 (see columns 2 of Table 5 and Table 6), and therefore 
might not be truly representative of actual behavior. That said, there is room for future 
research to test the significance of the number of adults variable as it differs at the 
baseline and at the endline.  
Summary of section V and VI Results 
The results of sections V and VI draw a distinction between variables that matter 
to achieve more financial inclusion and variables that matter to encourage the poor to 
save more amounts. Table 1.4 summarizes the most important variables that are positive, 
ranked in order of the magnitude of their effect:  
 Household characteristics that 
increase the probability of having a 
savings account 
Household characteristics that 
increase the amount saved in 
the savings account 
 
2008 
(Baseline) 
1. Ownership of a functional 
cellphone*** 
2. Number of salaried members*** 
3. Gender of household head is 
male*** 
1. Household owns a 
business** 
2. Household head is 
married** 
3. Number of salaried 
members** 
2010 (Endline) 1. Ownership of a functional 
cellphone*** 
2. Household head can read 
Chichewa*** 
3. Number of members who can read   
Chichewa*** 
1. Ownership of a functional 
cellphone*** 
 
Table 1.4: Comparison of household determinants of having formal savings and the amounts saved, at the 
baseline and at the endline. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, and ** indicates significance at the 
5% level.  
 
Table 1.4 shows the characteristics of households who are most likely to be 
financially included (with formal savings accounts), and households that use these 
accounts to save the most amount. It draws a distinction between the focus of financial 
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inclusion to get more individuals to open savings accounts, and the focus of encouraging 
poor households to save money in those accounts. This information might be useful for 
microfinance institutions that research the behaviors and saving patterns of poor 
households.  
In summation, I conclude that a household with a functional cellphone is most 
likely to have a savings account; a household with a business and a married head is likely 
to save the most; at the baseline (2008), a household with the highest number of salaried 
members has the high probability of having a savings account, and the most amounts of 
savings as well; and lastly, at the endline (2010), a household with a functional cellphone 
has the high probability of having a savings account, and the most amounts of savings as 
well. 
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VII. Household Determinants of Adopting Formal Savings 
 
This section compares the effect of variables on the probability of adopting a 
formal savings account i.e. the determinants of whether a household (which did not own a 
savings account at the baseline) will have adopted a savings account at the endline. Table 
7 table illustrates the effects of household characteristics on the likelihood of adopting a 
formal savings account. The analysis is split into three regressions; First, I will discuss 
the effect of household characteristics on savings adoption for all 1,828 observations that 
did not own a savings account in 2008. This includes both the treatment and the control 
groups, as shown in column 1 of Table 7. 
Second, I will discuss the effect of household characteristics on savings adoption 
for households in the control group. In this case, the household characteristics affect 
savings adoption in absence of any marketing and awareness campaigns of OIBM 
banking services. However, they still had access to the newly introduced van bank 
service. Column 2 shows that 940 households were not exposed to the marketing efforts 
of OIBM. If you recall the Technology Adoption Life Cycle curve discussed in section I, 
it shows that such households are the “innovators” in adoption of formal savings. These 
households do not need to be targeted by the bank to provide any marketing or awareness 
of the financial service. They are the first ones to adopt formal savings regardless.  
Third, I will discuss the effect of household characteristics on savings adoption 
for households in the treatment group. In this case, the household characteristics affect 
savings adoption differently. The marketing and awareness campaigns of OIBM banking 
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services alter the effect of household characteristics on its savings adoption decision. 
Column 3 shows that 1,828 households were exposed to the marketing efforts of OIBM. 
Given that these households choose to adopt formal savings when targeted by the 
marketing campaigns, they are the early adopters of microsavings. 
The difference between the treatment and the control effects should exhibit the 
“added effect” the OIBM banking marketing outreach on the household’s decision to 
adopt a formal savings account. To estimate this difference, I run another linear 
probability regression with household variables interacted with a dummy treatment 
variable “T”. The revised regression equation for testing the results of treatment is shown 
in Table 1.5: 
Yi = α0 + α00T + α1 (Gender)i  + α11 (Gender)i*T + α2 (Age) i + α22 (Age) i*T + α3 
(Age2) I + α33 (Age2) i*T + α4 (Married) i + α44 (Married) i*T + α5 (Literacy) i + α55 
(Literacy) i*T + β1 (Salaried members) i + β11 (Salaried members) i*T + β2 (Literate 
members) i + β22 (Literate members) i*T + β3 (Business) i + β33 (Business) i*T + β4 
(Distance) i  + β44 (Distance) i*T + β5 (Cellphone) I + β55 (Cellphone) i*T + ϒ1 (Adults) i 
+ ϒ11 (Adults) i*T + ϒ2 (Children) i + ϒ22 (Children) i*T + ɛ 
Table 1.5: Regression equation for variables exhibited in Table 7. *T indicates interaction of household 
characteristics with the treatment variable. The coefficients of these variables exhibit the “added effect” of 
treatment on that household determinant of savings.  
 
One of the purposes of this paper is specifically to identity the initial adopters of 
formal savings. Column 3 in Table 7 shows that regardless of the household 
characteristics, the exposure to the marketing of OIBM’s savings services increases the 
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probability of savings adoption by 8.25 percentage points amongst the group of treated 
households. Although this result is not statistically significant, it may imply that the 
awareness of OIBM’s new van bank service can have a positive effect on poor 
households’ decisions to open savings accounts. In other words, had OIBM bank not 
provided any promotional campaigns for its van bank, and had silently continued driving 
the van bank service closer to villages, the adoption rate could have been quite lower. 
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i. Identifying the Innovators 
 
Column 2 in Table 7 lists the effects of household characteristics for observations 
that may choose to adopt formal savings provided by the new van bank service, without 
receiving any informational campaign. Households from the control group that choose to 
adopt savings are the innovators. Characteristics of such households are discussed below: 
Characteristics of the household head 
Column 2 shows that household head’s literacy carries the most significance (at 
the .05 level) amongst this category of variables. If the household head can read 
Chichewa, the household’s inclination to adopt savings is estimated to increase by 5.09 
percentage points. This may imply that if a household head can read Chichewa, he or she 
may be able to open a formal savings account without any help from OIBM bank’s 
promotional assistants and coordinators. A literate household head may be able to reach 
out to the bank, read through the required documentation, and open an account without 
any assistance in understanding basic bank requirements.  
Results show, without significance however, that female household heads are 
more likely to adopt formal savings in the control group. Further, if the household head in 
the control group is married, the estimated increase in the probability of savings adoption 
is 0.5 percentage points, with no statistical significance. 
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Non-head characteristics of the household 
With each additional member in the household who can read Chichewa, the 
probability of adopting formal savings increases  by 1.9 percentage points, significant at 
the .1 level. This may be the case because the more literate adults under one roof, the 
more people who can go through the documentation and the process of opening an 
account without any promotional help, or at least assist the household head in doing so. 
Further, if someone in the household head owns a cellphone, the probability of adopting a 
savings account increases by approximately 10 percentage points, significant at the .05 
level. This may be an important finding for banks as they could potentially expect 
households with a functional cellphone (or with the wealth level to afford a working 
cellphone) to be their first customers.  
As the number of salaried household members increases, we can expect a positive 
increase in the probability of savings adoption (by 4.7 percentage points). One rationale 
behind this result might be that households with more salaried members may be 
motivated to store all their savings in one secure location, regardless of a formal bank 
informing them of their services. This result, however, is not statistically significant. 
Similarly, the effect of owning a business is small and not statistically significant in the 
control group. If a household owns at least one business, it is 1.1 percentage points more 
likely to adopt formal savings without the bank approaching them personally. On the 
other hand, the effect of distance holds significance. The closer the household to the 
bank, the higher the probability that it will adopt formal savings without receiving any 
promotions. In our sample, households closer to the trading center might stumble upon 
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the van bank service being offered, and as a consequence, may choose to open an 
account.   
Household size 
In terms of household size, results show that with every additional adult in the 
household, the probability of savings adoption increases by 3.5 percentage points, 
significant at the .05 level. If a household has more adults, it may have more chances of 
coming across the ban services without the bank specifically reaching out to the 
household head. In our sample, the more the number of adults in a household, the more 
the chances that one of those adults came across the van bank service at one of the 
trading centers. Thus, it is possible that banks can expect households with more adults to 
reach out to their services. On the other hand, the effect of having an additional child in 
the household increases the likelihood of savings adoption by a negligible and 
statistically insignificant value.  
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ii. Identifying the Early Adopters 
 
The coefficients of the interaction variables in Table 7 Column 3 exhibit the 
“added effect” of marketing banking services on the decision to adopt formal savings. 
Results of this added effect are illustrated by the interaction variables of household 
characteristics and the treatment variable. A majority of these results in column 3 do not 
hold enough significance to accurately represent the actual effect of marketing on 
household characteristics. This opens room for future research on finding the added effect 
of marketing on adoption decisions with statistical significance. In this section, I will 
discuss the effects of treatment by drawing attention to the magnitude of variables in 
focus. Although the lack of significance does not cement an accurate definition of the 
early adopters, nonetheless, it gives us an idea of what an estimated early adopter looks 
like. 
The treatment variable by itself implies that despite the household characteristics, 
simply providing treatment (exposure to the awareness of OIBM banking services) 
increased the likelihood of an unbanked household adopting a savings account by 
approximately 9 percentage points. The characteristics of an early adopter household are 
discussed below: 
Characteristics of the household head 
Exposure to marketing and awareness of bank services damps the effect of 
increasing age of a household head. Results show that as the household head gets older, 
exposure to the bank’s marketing efforts may reduce the probability of formal savings 
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adoption by 0.22 percentage points. This implies that a bank may be better of reaching 
out to younger household heads. For example, a household head aged 30 is 
approximately 22 percentage points more likely to adopt formal savings than a household 
head aged 40, when exposed to the bank’s promotions.  
We can see a similar effect of treatment on the effect of gender. Providing a male 
household head with exposure to a bank’s marketing services increases his likelihood of 
savings adoption by 2.09 percentage points. This result may indicate that male household 
heads may not be as willing to reach out to the bank independently as female household 
heads, and may require information on the benefits and process of opening formal 
savings.  
Note that treatment also reverses the effect of the literacy variable. If a household 
head can read Chichewa, he or she is approximately 5 percentage points more likely to 
adopt formal savings, significant at the .05 level. Reaching out to these households, as 
part of a marketing or promotional campaign, lowers this effect by approximately 1 
percentage point. This result may suggest that banks may be better off allocating 
resources to provide information and assistance to household heads who cannot read 
Chichewa. Lastly, if the household head is married, the added effect of treatment is 1.5 
percentage points. These effects lack the significance to be estimated as a characteristic 
of an early adopter. 
Non-head characteristics of the household 
Treatment has an added positive effect of 0.82 percentage points for each 
additional member in the household who can read Chichewa. It may be the case that 
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members who can read Chichewa can better understand the informational sessions 
provided by OIBM, or can better respond to the marketing efforts of OIBM. Therefore, as 
more literate members in a household are exposed to treatment, the higher the probability 
of savings adoption.  
While the effect of treatment on the literacy variable is quite low, its effect on the 
ownership of a cellphone is high. If a targeted household owns a cellphone, it is 9.96 
percentage points more likely to adopt savings when provided access, significant at the 
.05 level. If we provide treatment to such a household, the probability of savings adoption 
increases by 12.2 percentage points, significant at the .10 level. Therefore, if banks 
provide access and marketing to households in which someone owns a functional 
cellphone, they boost the likelihood of formal savings adoption significantly by 22.16 
percentage points. 
Household Size 
In context of household size, if a household is exposed to the awareness programs 
of the bank, the effect of having an additional child decreases the probability of savings 
adoption by 0.8 percentage points. Given the negligible and insignificant value of this 
result, it is ambiguous how the number of children in a household alters its adoption 
decision upon receiving marketing from the bank. On the other hand, for every additional 
adult in the household, the likelihood of adopting a formal savings account increases by 
1.3 percentage points in the treatment group. One takeaway from these results is that the 
magnitude of adults interacted with treatment is higher than the magnitude of children 
interacted with treatment. But the significance of both variables it too weak to make an 
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expectation that formal savings promotions can negatively affect the adoption decisions 
of bigger households. 
Summary of section VII results 
Based on the estimated results in Table 7 Column 3, an early adopter, or a 
household most likely to adopt formal savings due to the marketing efforts of a bank has 
a functional cellphone, and may have a small size, a young, male head who cannot read 
Chichewa, and adults who can read Chichewa. Apart from the predicted effects of 
cellphone ownership, this estimation calls for further research and confirmation in 
significance. 
Compare this “early adopter” household to an “innovator” household. Both 
groups are similar in the fact that households own a functional cellphone and that non-
head members can read Chichewa. The fact that ownership of a functional cellphone 
boosts the probability of savings adoption (for both control and treatment groups) 
concludes that households with a functional cellphone are most likely to be the intial 
adopters of formal savings.  
In conclusion, based on the differences between the characteristics exhibited by 
the innovators and the early adopters, banks are most likely to acquire customers when 
they provide access to households that have a head who can read Chichewa, a functional 
cellphone, more adults who can read Chichewa, and are closer to the bank center. On the 
other hand, banks may be more cost and time efficient in their marketing efforts if they 
target their marketing efforts towards smaller households with a young, male head, who 
owns a functional cellphone.  
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
In order to broaden their reach with a promising rate of financial inclusion, 
microsavings programs should understand three aspects of the poor households they 
serve: who these households are, why they save, and how they save. This paper takes the 
first step in that direction – identifying who these households are (at least two groups of 
them – the innovators and the early adopters). Organizations might be tempted to employ 
an aggressive drive to reach out to all households with the same promotional strategy at 
the same time. However, the results might not be promising. For instance, Ramji (2009) 
finds that an expansion of formal savings to unbanked households in the Gulbarga district 
of India had an insignificant impact, despite an aggressive drive to maximize financial 
inclusion. At the end of the drive, 70% of the sample still remained unbanked. In 
addition, results show that the accounts were opened by individuals who had pre-existing 
savings accounts.  
Achieving financial inclusion in any given community takes time and a strategic 
approach. Financial institutions must acquire households group by group (innovators, 
early adopters, early majority, late majority, and finally, laggards), retain commitment by 
catering to specific savings needs, and grow until they reach their desired financial 
inclusion goal. The first step in that direction is identifying who the initial adopters are. In 
this paper, we identified the innovators and the early adopters of formal savings - 
households that are the first customers of microsavings. The innovators group of 
households adopted formal savings accounts at the new van bank simply when OIBM 
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expanded access closer to their villages.  On the other hand, the early adopters group of 
households adopted formal savings accounts at the new van bank when OIBM expanded 
access accompanied by an informational campaign in their village. Based on the 
definitions of these two groups, a bank can save time and cut down marketing expenses 
by not targeting the innovators, and instead gearing the promotional campaigns towards 
the early adopters.  
My results show that the following characteristics boost the probability of a 
household willing to adopt formal savings simply when granted access to the service: 
household head can read Chichewa; someone in the household owns a functional 
cellphone; households consists of adults who can read Chichewa; and the household is 
close to the bank. With this information, a formal savings provider can grasp an idea of 
who to expand access to in order to acquire more customers.  
Following the group of households mentioned above, who adopt savings simply 
when provided access, early adopters are the next big pool of customers that a financial 
institution serves. I find that households in the early adopters own a functional cellphone, 
which increases their likelihood of savings adoption significantly when exposed to a 
bank’s promotions. However, since results for other characteristics are only suggestive of 
what an early adopter household could look like, there is room for additional research on 
accurately identifying the early adopters of formal savings. One way to identify the early 
adopters could be to run a similar field experiment, where the treatment is exposure to the 
marketing campaigns of a bank’s services, followed by an examination of the differences 
in household level determinants of formal savings adoption. In addition, similar research 
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can identify the initial adopters of informal savings, credit, insurance programs, and other 
services of microfinance institutions. For organizations that provide a range of services to 
the poor, information on the initial adopters or individuals for each of those services can 
broaden the breadth of their reach. Lastly, some results in this paper are only suggestive 
of actual household behaviors and offer avenues for further research. For example, 
section VI poses a question to see how the number of adults within a household affects 
the amounts in formal savings accounts when the bank is driven closer to the household. 
Once the initial adopters have been identified, microfinance institutions can take 
strategic measures to approach these individuals in a way that maximizes probability of 
adoption. Research on the interaction between a bank agent and a household can provide 
answers to a broad array of questions. For instance, how does the gender of the financial 
organization’s information provider affect a household head’s decision to take up 
savings? Does a specific milieu of interaction (be it through public meetings, one on one 
interaction in the household, group interaction at the bank, etc) increase the likelihood of 
savings adoption? As economists and social entrepreneurs, such questions are crucial to 
ask because they can improve the efficiency of microsavings efforts. For the populations 
of poor who want to save but are waiting for access, formal savings services might be 
their springboard to rise above poverty. The process of expanding financial services to 
poor households may be sensitive to several factors; the more we are aware of them, the 
more we can maximize chances of financial inclusion for every poor household.  
 
      * * * * 
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Table 2: Results of splitting the household size with changing literacy variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Has savings 
(2008) 
Has savings 
(2008) 
Has savings 
(2008) 
Has savings 
(2008) 
     
Age 0.000564 0.000680 0.000133 -0.000207 
 (0.000499) (0.000491) (0.000489) (0.000499) 
Gender 0.0490*** 0.0518*** 0.0592*** 0.0493*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0142) 
Number of salaried 
members 
0.177*** 
(0.0368) 
0.177*** 
(0.0366) 
0.150*** 
(0.0308) 
0.152*** 
(0.0314) 
 
Ownership of business 0.0569*** 0.0575*** 0.0500*** 0.0488*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0143) 
Number of literate 
members (dummy) 
0.0829*** 
(0.0119) 
0.0848*** 
(0.0117) 
  
   
Number of adults 0.0181**  -0.0274**  
 (0.00910)  (0.0105)  
Number of children 0.0113**  -0.00221  
 (0.00440)  (0.00432)  
Household size  0.0127***  -0.00558 
  (0.00383)  (0.00408) 
Number of literate 
members (continuous) 
  0.0549*** 
(0.00650) 
 0.0500*** 
(0.00592) 
   
Constant -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.0253 -0.0341 
 (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0258) (0.0255) 
     
Observations 2,395 2,395 2,395 2,395 
R-squared 0.087 0.087 0.126 0.124 
 
Notes: This table compares the effect of splitting up household size into adults and children, with different 
literacy variables at the baseline. Column 1 includes number of adults, number of children, and a dummy 
variable for household literacy (1 if anyone in the household can read Chichewa). Column 2 includes the 
household size, and a dummy variable for household literacy (1 if anyone in the household can read 
Chichewa). Column 3 includes number of adults, number of children, and a continuous variable for 
household literacy (adding on the value of each member who can read Chichewa). Column 4 includes the 
household size and a continuous variable for household literacy (adding on the value of each member who 
can read Chichewa). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted for 118 clusters. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
  
 
 
Table 3: Effect of literacy variables on the magnitude of household size variables 
 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 Table 3 are the same as columns 1 and 3 in Table 2. All columns include number of adults and number of children, instead of one household size variable. Each column accounts for a 
different literacy variable: Column 1 includes a dummy for at least one member who can read, column 2 includes a continuous variable for number of members who can read, column 3 includes a dummy for at 
least one member (except the head) who can read, column 4 includes a continuous variable for at least one member (except the head) who can read, column 5 includes a dummy only for the head’s ability to read, 
and column 6 includes one continuous variable for number of members (except the head) who can read and  a dummy for the head’s ability to read. Clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Has savings (2008) Has savings (2008) Has savings (2008) Has savings (2008) Has savings (2008) Has savings (2008) 
       
Age 0.000564 0.000133 0.000438 -0.000122 0.000911* 0.000280 
 (0.000499) (0.000489) (0.000499) (0.000504) (0.000489) (0.000495) 
Gender 0.0490*** 0.0592*** 0.0557*** 0.0739*** 0.0290* 0.0519*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0145) (0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0150) 
Number of salaried 
members 
0.177*** 
(0.0368) 
0.150*** 
(0.0308) 
0.176*** 
(0.0361) 
0.156*** 
(0.0313) 
0.168*** 
(0.0357) 
0.150*** 
(0.0310) 
 
Ownership of Business 0.0569*** 0.0500*** 0.0564*** 0.0535*** 0.0526*** 0.0491*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0145) 
Number of literate members 
(dummy) 
0.0829*** 
(0.0119) 
 
     
      
Number of adults 0.0181** -0.0274** 0.0118 -0.0266** 0.0192** -0.0239** 
 (0.00910) (0.0105) (0.00917) (0.0110) (0.00893) (0.0111) 
Number of children 0.0113** -0.00221 0.00904** -0.00292 0.0126*** -0.000776 
 (0.00440) (0.00432) (0.00434) (0.00453) (0.00436) (0.00450) 
 
Number of literate members 
(cont.) 
 0.0549*** 
(0.00650) 
    
      
Number of literate members, 
except the head (dummy) 
  0.0877*** 
(0.0154) 
   
      
Number of literate members, 
except the head (cont.) 
   0.0568*** 
(0.00760) 
 0.0498*** 
(0.00746) 
     
Literacy (dummy)     0.104*** 0.0767*** 
     (0.0130) (0.0117) 
Constant -0.137*** -0.0253 -0.107*** 0.00606 -0.138*** -0.0447 
 (0.0244) (0.0258) (0.0240) (0.0284) (0.0254) (0.0285) 
       
Observations 2,395 2,395 2,395 2,395 2,395 2,395 
R-squared 0.087 0.126 0.094 0.117 0.101 0.127 
Table 4: Household determinants of having a formal savings account: 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Has savings 
 (2008) 
Has savings 
(2010) 
   
Age -0.000146 -0.00220 
 (0.00243) (0.00316)  
Age2 6.61e-06 2.10e-05  
 (2.68e-05) (3.28e-05)  
Gender 0.0868*** 0.0127  
 (0.0260) (0.0361)  
Number of salaried 
members 
0.0923*** 0.0386  
 (0.0233) (0.0279)  
Ownership of business 0.0261* -0.00924  
 (0.0142) (0.0176)  
Literacy 0.0569*** 0.0864***  
 (0.0115) (0.0167)  
Number of literate 
members 
0.0324*** 0.0306***  
 (0.00583) (0.00682)  
Number of adults -0.0158 0.0289***  
 (0.00998) (0.00990)  
Number of children 0.00413 0.00159  
 (0.00449) (0.00516) 
Marital status -0.0437 -0.000805 
 (0.0293) (0.0364) 
Ownership of cellphone 0.262*** 0.252*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0312) 
Distance from EA -0.00452 -0.00649* 
 (0.00318) (0.00366) 
Constant -0.00777 0.0481 
 (0.0589) (0.0788) 
   
Observations 2,395 2,057 
R-squared 0.197 0.141 
 
Notes: This table reports the likelihood of having a formal savings account at the baseline (2008) 
and at the endline (2010) as determined by household characteristics. The observations at the 
baseline and the endline include both the assigned control and treatment households. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted for 118 clusters. *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Household determinants of formal savings adoption and amounts saved 
at the baseline 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Has savings 
(2008) 
Amount in account 
(2008) 
   
Age -0.000146 1,480 
 (0.00243) (1,644) 
Age2 6.61e-06 -15.91 
 (2.68e-05) (16.65) 
Gender 0.0868*** 3,021 
 (0.0260) (8,825) 
Number of salaried 
members 
0.0923*** 14,531** 
 (0.0233) (7,192) 
Ownership of business 0.0261* 33,285** 
 (0.0142) (13,578) 
Literacy 0.0569*** 97.22 
 (0.0115) (11,575) 
Number of literate 
members 
0.0324*** 5,608** 
 (0.00583) (2,399) 
Number of adults -0.0158 152.8 
 (0.00998) (4,448) 
Number of children 0.00413 -5,923*** 
 (0.00449) (2,243) 
Marital status -0.0437 19,240** 
 (0.0293) (8,354) 
Ownership of cellphone 0.262*** 8,238 
 (0.0333) (7,358) 
Distance from EA -0.00452 -619.2 
 (0.00318) (814.3) 
Constant -0.00777 -40,944 
 (0.0589) (52,996) 
   
Observations 2,395 278 
R-squared 0.197 0.112 
 
Notes: This table compares the effects of household characteristics on the likelihood of having a 
formal savings account and the amount saved in those accounts, at the baseline. Observations in 
column 1 include all households in the sample (except the ones missing for specific variables). 
Observations in column 2 include only the households that reported having a formal savings 
account. Clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In column 2, the reported 
currency is Malawian Kwacha, where the exchange rate is 1 MWK = 0. 0.0071 USD for the year 
2008. . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted for 118 clusters. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Household determinants of formal savings adoption and amounts saved at the 
endline 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Has savings 
(2010) 
Amount in account  
(2010) 
   
Age -0.00220 -215.1 
 (0.00316) (726.6) 
Age2 2.10e-05 2.561 
 (3.28e-05) (7.029) 
Gender 0.0127 -2,935 
 (0.0361) (11,349) 
Number of salaried 
members 
0.0386 1,725 
 (0.0279) (6,403) 
Ownership of business -0.00924 8,315 
 (0.0176) (5,769) 
Literacy 0.0864*** -3,169 
 (0.0167) (3,551) 
Number of literate 
members 
0.0306*** 982.5 
 (0.00682) (2,272) 
Marital status -0.000805 8,505 
 (0.0364) (9,089) 
Ownership of cellphone 0.252*** 19,440*** 
 (0.0312) (6,967) 
Distance from EA -0.00649* -623.6 
 (0.00366) (515.4) 
Number of adults 0.0289*** -2,614 
 (0.00990) (2,272) 
Number of children 0.00159 765.9 
 (0.00516) (1,359) 
Constant 0.0481 14,801 
 (0.0788) (19,804) 
   
Observations 2,057 330 
R-squared 0.141 0.079 
 
Notes: This table compares the effects of household characteristics on the likelihood of having a 
formal savings account and the amount saved in those accounts, at the endline. Observations in 
column 1 include all sampled households and observations in column 2 include only the 
households that reported having a formal savings account. Clustered robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. In column 2, the reported currency is Malawian Kwacha, where the 
exchange rate is 1 MWK = 0.0065 USD for the year 2010. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, adjusted for 118 clusters. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Household determinants of adopting formal savings  
 (1) (2/Control) (3/Treatment) 
VARIABLES Has Savings 
(2010) 
Has Savings (2010) Has Savings      
    (2010) 
    
Age 4.76e-05 0.00141 0.00141 
 (0.00307) (0.00339) (0.00338) 
Age* T   -0.00226 
   (0.00617) 
Age2 -7.42e-06 -2.12e-05 -2.12e-05 
 (3.19e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.54e-05) 
Age2* T   2.16e-05 
   (6.33e-05) 
Gender -0.0168 -0.0277 -0.0277 
 (0.0324) (0.0420) (0.0418) 
Gender* T   0.0209 
   (0.0655) 
Number of salaried members 0.0169 0.0479 0.0479 
 (0.0268) (0.0316) (0.0315) 
Number of salaried members* T   -0.0556 
   (0.0526) 
Ownership of business -0.00393 0.0116 0.0116 
 (0.0177) (0.0244) (0.0243) 
Ownership of business* T   -0.0321 
   (0.0350) 
Literacy 0.0468*** 0.0509** 0.0509** 
 (0.0149) (0.0214) (0.0213) 
Literacy* T   -0.0105 
   (0.0298) 
Number of literate members 0.0247*** 0.0194* 0.0194* 
 (0.00732) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
Number of literate members* T   0.00826 
   (0.0148) 
Marital status 0.0118 0.00564 0.00564 
 (0.0343) (0.0461) (0.0459) 
Marital status* T   0.0151 
   (0.0692) 
Ownership of cellphone 0.169*** 0.0996** 0.0996** 
 (0.0348) (0.0465) (0.0463) 
Ownership of cellphone* T   0.122* 
   (0.0670) 
Distance from EA -0.00571* -0.00637* -0.00637* 
 (0.00295) (0.00364) (0.00362) 
Distance from EA* T   0.000876 
   (0.00606) 
Number of adults 0.0276*** 0.0351** 0.0351** 
 (0.0100) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
Number of adults* T   -0.0135 
   (0.0201) 
Number of children 0.000864 0.00459 0.00459 
 (0.00488) (0.00535) (0.00533) 
Number of children* T   -0.00824 
   (0.0101) 
Treatment   0.0908 
   (0.157) 
Constant 0.0252 -0.0208 -0.0208 
 (0.0773) (0.0830) (0.0827) 
    
Observations 1,828 940 1,828 
R-squared 0.074 0.065 0.079 
 
Notes: This table illustrates the effects of household characteristics on the likelihood of adopting a formal savings account. 
Column 1 includes all 1,828 observations (both control and treatment) that did not own formal savings in 2008. Column 2 
includes the control group, which was excluded from receiving any marketing of OIBM’s van bank. Column 3 illustrates the 
“added effect” of treatment on household characteristics as they affect the likelihood of adopting formal savings. Column 2 
represents characteristics of the innovators and and column 3 represents the early adopters. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses; adjusted for 118 clusters in column 1, for 60 clusters in column 2, and 58 clusters in column 3. 
***indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
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